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ANOTHER DIMENSION
W
e present a consumer-focused perspective on creat-
ing communications regarding potentially contami-
nated foods. It is illustrated with decisions that might have 
faced US consumers during the 2009 recalls of peanut and 
pistachio products. The example shows how knowledge 
about test results and regulatory processes might be made 
more useful to consumers.
December 12, 2008
A prudent, informed consumer is about to open a jar 
of peanut butter. It is one of her favorite foods. Mostly, she 
loves the taste, but she also knows it as a cheap, healthy 
food—although she is a little fuzzy on those details (1–3). 
Like most Americans, she always has peanut butter at 
home. Unlike most, though, she always considers the risk 
for Salmonella infection, before opening a new jar, then de-
cides whether to eat it, toss it, or wait a month to see if any 
problems turn up. She has done some research too. Here is 
her reasoning.
If she eats the peanut butter and gets salmonellosis, 
then she has to pay for treatment and lose work time. The 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimated that an 
average case in 2007 cost $1,821 in lost wages and medi-
cal costs (4). She can imagine her case costing less (if her 
insurance covers the medical costs and she uses otherwise 
“wasted” sick-leave days) or more (if the opposite is true), 
but she decides to use $1,821 in her decision making.
If she throws out the peanut butter, she will lose its $3 
cost. Getting a refund is such a hassle that it will still feel 
like losing $3.
If she waits a month, she will incur the opportunity 
cost of the money tied up in the peanut butter. She puts that 
at $0.02 (using 8% annual percentage rate).
Now, she just needs to know the probability of sal-
monellosis. If it is greater than 1/607, then she should toss 
the jar, comparing its cost ($3) with that of getting sick 
($1,821). If it is greater than 1/91,050, then she should wait 
a month, comparing its cost ($0.02) with that for getting 
sick ($1,821), assuming that food inspectors ﬁ  nd any prob-
lem by then, which makes the risk zero.
But money isn’t everything.
If she throws out the jar, getting another will be a small 
hassle. She decides that the $3 covers that. She would feel 
bad about wasting the food but also feel good about her 
prudence. So, those psychological effects balance out. She 
vaguely worries that the same logic will lead her to throw 
away the next jar (and the next). That would make her feel 
bad.
If she waits a month, then the peanut butter might lose 
taste or nutritional value, or somehow “go bad.” However, 
she can’t ﬁ  nd any good information about those possibili-
ties and decides to ignore them. It is just a month.
Therefore, if she eats from the jar, the only important 
nonmonetary consequence is her getting salmonellosis. 
She knows that it usually involves an illness of 4–7 days, 
with diarrhea, fever, and abdominal cramps, and that most 
persons recover without treatment. However, the diarrhea 
sometimes calls for hospitalization, and the infection can 
spread to the blood. People can die, if not treated promptly 
with antimicrobial drugs (5). Even if USDA has not put a 
dollar value on suffering, she would pay a lot to avoid it. 
She would pay even more if she had, or was making the 
decision for someone with, a weak immune system.
If she tosses the jar, then she will face the risk of 
driving to the store to get it. She puts that at 1 chance in 
100,000 of an accident, and 1 chance in 50 of that crash 
being fatal (6).
If she eats from the jar and it contains any Salmonella 
bacteria, she will probably consume some of the bacteria, 
given how peanut butter is made. She realizes that she can 
put an upper boundary on that risk: in 2007, a total of 1 
in 6,702 Americans contracted foodborne salmonellosis, 
from all sources (7). Given that most Americans eat pea-
nut butter, her chances must be smaller—unless there are 
problems.
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That probability is much less than the 1/607 threshold. 
Therefore, based on purely economic considerations, there 
is no point in tossing the jar, even if she considers the suf-
fering that USDA ignored. That probability is higher than 
the 1/91,050 threshold for waiting. But 1/6,702 is such a 
conservative estimate and there are so many nonmonetary 
reasons not to wait—and the peanut butter looks so good.
She knows the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) montiors food safety, and she checks its website for 
recall notices (8). No reported problems! So, she opens the 
jar and enjoys the great taste of peanut butter.
January 12, 2009
A month later, she buys a new jar. The next day, her 
morning web check ﬁ  nds that FDA, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, USDA, and others are inves-
tigating a multistate outbreak of Salmonella enterica sero-
var Typhimurium infection, and peanut butter is the likely 
source. FDA is inspecting an unnamed manufacturer and 
tracing its distribution channels.
Looking at her new jar, she realizes that only one 
thing has changed since her last decision: the probability 
of contamination. It must be larger, but by how much? 
The announcement says nothing about that probability and 
provides no advice. She wonders what that means. Is the 
outbreak under control? Are they waiting for authoritative 
information? Is it up to the ﬁ  rm to issue a recall?
Without a clear signal, she opens the jar. The peanut 
butter tastes as good as ever, but she does not enjoy it as 
much. In fact, she is so troubled about what she has just 
eaten that she expands her online search beyond her daily 
visit to the recall website. She realizes that she can’t undo 
her exposure. However, perhaps she can get some reassur-
ance—or faster medical attention, if need be.
The recall website mentions no product names. How-
ever, her Google search (on “peanut butter,” “Salmonella,” 
and “multistate outbreak”) shows that, 2 days earlier, King 
Nut Company voluntarily recalled peanut butter manufac-
tured by Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) and distrib-
uted under its King Nut and Parnell’s Pride labels. King 
Nut says that these brands are only sold wholesale and that 
all its other products are safe. Although she eats another 
brand, she keeps worrying.
How conﬁ  dent can King Nut be about its other brands? 
Are none of the peanuts grown in the same ﬁ  elds, shipped 
in the same trucks, processed at the same facilities, or han-
dled by the same employees? Are other companies doing 
their own inspections? Can FDA require tests and recalls? 
How good, and fast, are the tests? Without answers to these 
questions, what has been found does not tell her what might 
be found.
Over the next month, she has good news: she does 
not get sick. She also has bad news: seeing the outbreak 
reports explode on her daily website checks. Although 
she is ﬁ  ne physically, she feels like she has dodged a bul-
let. She cannot understand the 2-day lag between the an-
nouncements by the government and by King Nut, which 
she kicks herself for having missed. Had she gotten sick, 
would she have found the information that she needed to 
get timely treatment?
February 12, 2009
It’s time to buy more peanut butter. However, a lot has 
happened during the last month. On January 13, PCA an-
nounced a voluntary recall of 21 lots of peanut butter and 
peanut paste produced in its Blakely, Georgia, USA, facil-
ity. By January 27, it had expanded the recall 3 more times. 
The next day, PCA recalled all dry- and oil-roasted peanuts 
and peanut products processed at Blakely since January 1, 
2007. On January 30, FDA conﬁ  rmed reports of a criminal 
investigation of PCA for continuing to ship products af-
ter receiving positive Salmonella test results. Hundreds of 
persons are sick; 9 die. The case-fatality rate is about that 
of previous outbreaks, which suggests that the strain is not 
unusual, although the scope is.
The recall website now provides consumer recommen-
dations and a searchable database, for recalled products. 
Her favorite brand is not on the list, so she still believes that 
her risk is negligible. She makes her usual monthly pur-
chase, then has a moment of truth when she gets home: she 
still does not know how anyone decides which products to 
test or what information to share. That 2-day lag still both-
ers her, as does wondering when the criminal investigation 
began. She is unhappy about her “no news is good news” 
inference, last month, and maybe this one, too.
She is devoted to FDA's websites: however, she also 
knows that there are limits to its resources and legal author-
ity. She just doesn’t know what they are. So, she makes 
some guesses.
Given the stream of new recalls, she concludes that 
FDA waits for strong positive evidence before saying any-
thing. As a result, she can’t tell whether her favorite brand 
has been cleared or just not yet tested. Her rule is still to 
toss a jar if the risk is over 1/607. The recall list current-
ly has ≈50 peanut products. There would have to be over 
30,350 (50 × 607) peanut products, for the rate to be under 
her threshold. She should toss the jar if there is a similar 
rate among products that have not been ofﬁ  cially cleared.
But what does she know? Maybe she should be wor-
ried that other foods are processed, shipped, or shelved 
along with the peanut butter. She knows that life has risks 
and she is willing to take reasonable ones. But she hates not 
knowing what’s going on.
In the following days, the number of salmonellosis 
cases increases, conﬁ  rming her fears. Still, there is no recall 
for the major national brands, including her own. That’s 
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good. She just doesn’t know how good without understand-
ing what gets tested and announced.
At least she can eat her second favorite nut product, 
pistachios.
March 12, 2009
Her month of watchful waiting has passed. Her morn-
ing website checks have found a continuing but slackening 
stream of recall notices and salmonellosis cases. FDA re-
ports conducting more audits and inspections and collabo-
rating with other authorities. It still has found no contami-
nation in major national brands. Although that message has 
not changed, she assumes that the supporting evidence is 
now stronger. Still, she is unnerved enough not to open her 
jar or to buy other peanut products, just in case she has 
missed something. She’ll stick with pistachios.
During the month, she had a disquieting experience: 
She returned a box of peanut butter granola bars. The mer-
chant refunded her money, no questions asked. However, 
she found that the product was still on the shelves, while 
her favorite granola bar, with the tiny chocolate chips, was 
missing. She guesses that the store was humoring her, by 
giving a refund for a safe product, while peanut butter was 
a micro ingredient in the chocolate chip bar. The refund 
gets her wondering whether food manufacturers are more 
careful with products featuring peanut butter, compared to 
ones where it is a trace ingredient (or an “industrial chemi-
cal”). She hopes that qualiﬁ  ed people worry about these 
things. She just wants useful information.
March 31, 2009
Her morning web check reveals the shocking news 
that the second-largest US pistachio processor (Setton) has 
voluntarily recalled certain lots of roasted nuts. She never 
worried about pistachios before. However, if they can be 
contaminated, then she faces the same decision as with the 
peanut butter. The cost is even the same. To control her pas-
sion for pistachios, she buys small ($3) packages.
She has a harder time ﬁ  guring out the risks. The an-
nouncement advises that “Consumers should not eat pis-
tachios or food products containing them until they can 
determine that the products do not contain pistachios re-
called by Setton.” How can she tell? Are all those prod-
ucts sold under the Setton name? What does it mean that 
untested pistachios are suspect, whereas only tested pea-
nuts were? Are the risks that different? Perhaps pistachio 
and peanuts are processed differently. Perhaps Setton is 
less trustworthy than PCA (criminal investigation not-
withstanding). Perhaps the authorities know more than 
they are allowed to reveal. Perhaps the reporting policy 
has been changed. If so, how? Are they being hypercau-
tious? Can she then be totally conﬁ  dent about almonds, 
her third favorite nut? Or, are they being so cautious that 
everything will soon be suspect? If so, perhaps she should 
just eat those pistachios.
April 12, 2009
A month has passed without her favorite brand appear-
ing on the recall list. She is about to open the jar, when 
her morning Internet check ﬁ  nds that a company named 
Westco/Westcott has “declined” FDA’s request to recall its 
products with PCA peanuts and “to provide access to cer-
tain records about the distribution of these products.” In re-
sponse, FDA has asked US Marshals to execute an inspec-
tion warrant (9). She is shaken to learn that FDA cannot 
require food recalls. Realizing how little she knows about 
FDA’s authority and resources, she decides to let her poor 
jar sit for another month.
What Does She Want?
One morning, she notices a “Contact Us” option at the 
recall website. She thinks, “What do I want? I know that 
they’re working hard to protect me. But, somehow, I’m not 
quite getting the information that I need to protect myself. I 
like the notices’ standard format. I know how to ﬁ  nd things 
on it. I’ve learned to decode most of the jargon. I just don’t 
know what it all means in terms of my risks. Maybe if I 
grade some of the postings, it will clarify my thinking”:
January 12 (10). Grade: D. Although I learned that 
there was an outbreak, possibly related to peanut butter, I 
did not learn anything about what to do, even though the 
King Nut recall was already happening. Seeing how com-
plex the peanut production system is, I feel like they must 
have suspected that they had not found all the problems. 
They could have said, “We recommend not eating peanut 
products until we do more testing. Don’t throw them away, 
though; they may be ﬁ  ne.” They could also have said that 
they cannot force recalls or do all the testing that they want, 
so that I would know what they are up against.
January 16 (11). Grade: B. By saying that they could 
not say which brands to avoid, they allowed me to make 
a better decision. Still, it was unnerving to see such a big 
change, over 4 days, without an explanation why.
January 17–19 (12–14). Grade: B+. They recommend-
ed the decision that I would have made on my own, had I 
known what they knew. Still, I was left wondering about the 
PCA controversy and what it meant about future surprises. 
It would have helped just to hear, “We cannot comment on 
the ongoing criminal investigation of PCA.”
After thinking through these dates, she knows what 
she wants and thinks that it wouldn’t be too hard to do:
Talk to consumers •  . Find what decisions we face 
and what we worry about. I am cooking for one 
person and can afford to wait. Other people can’t.
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•   Tell us what you know—and don’t know. We 
would like you to be certain but don’t want to 
learn too late about possible problems.
•   Tell us if your hands are tied. If we expect you to 
do the impossible, then we’ll get mad at you, not 
at those who keep you from protecting us.
•   Get the information that we need. Do the tests 
that will tell us what not to eat. We don’t care that 
much about “all clears.”
•   Have some ordinary people read each message 
before you post it. If they understand it, then most 
everyone will.
Some of what she wants is happening already. For 
example, in January 2010, FDA established a new web-
site, FDA Basics, to inform consumers about how FDA 
works (31).
Coda
Our hypothetical consumer is unusually, but not im-
plausibly, thoughtful about her food safety decisions (and 
her love of peanut butter), given the picture that emerges 
from the large research literature on the topic (15,16). Al-
though consumers’ safety behavior is often disappointing, 
some of those failures reﬂ  ect their difﬁ  culty understanding 
what to do (17–23). Risk communication research often 
ﬁ  nds large gaps between what experts say and what con-
sumers hear—and need to hear. Fortunately, research can 
close much of that gap, allowing public health ofﬁ  cials to 
do all that is possible to help people to make wise choices 
in an uncertain world (24–31).
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